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8 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
9 **EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON**

10 RIVER CITY MEDIA, LLC, et al.,

11 Plaintiffs,

12 v.

13 KROMTECH ALLIANCE
14 CORPORATION, et al.,

15 Defendants.

Case No. 2:17-cv-00105-SAB

**DECLARATION OF MARK
FERRIS IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS**

16
17 I, Mark Ferris, make the following declaration based upon my own personal
18 knowledge and information provided to me by others at River City Media, LLC
19 ("River City"):

20 **Background on River City and Commercial Email Marketing**

21 1. I am a Member of, and the Chief Technical Officer for, River City
22 Media, LLC ("River City"). I reside in Idaho.

23 2. River City is a successful internet-based marketing company based in
24 Eastern Washington.

25 3. Some of the world's most recognizable brands use River City to help
26 market their products including MetLife, LifeLock, Liberty Mutual, Match.com,
27 DirectTV, and Lyft.
28

1 4. River City built its reputation on its consistent production of
2 transparent, clean, and quality email marketing campaigns. River City has never
3 been the subject of a federal or state investigation or lawsuit related to commercial
4 email laws or regulations, nor has River City been sued by a private party for
5 violations of the CAN-SPAM Act or other commercial email laws.

6 5. River City is a technology company focused entirely on internet
7 marketing and commercial email. It depends on its technology, data, and
8 relationships to survive and prosper. Most of River City's material is sensitive,
9 private, and proprietary data that includes fine-tuned methodologies and
10 technological know-how that River City considers to be its trade secrets.

11 6. In order to do business, River City must create or purchase massive
12 databases of consumer email addresses for people who have opted-in to receive
13 commercial email from advertisers and publishers.

14 7. River City also creates proprietary algorithms and techniques to
15 conduct its email marketing campaigns lawfully and with full transparency and the
16 highest quality. River City also maintains records for its partnerships and is
17 expected to keep those records safe and secure.

18 8. I have worked in the online marketing industry for over a decade and
19 am intimately familiar with what it takes to succeed in this industry. In my
20 experience, a company's reputation is paramount to its ability to succeed. River
21 City's reputation among marketing and advertising agencies and advertisers
22 themselves is—or was—one of its most valuable assets.

23 9. River City's ability to carry out its basic business operations depends
24 on relationships with dozens of third parties including internet access providers,
25 Email Service Providers, affiliates, advertisers, and more.

26 **Cyberattack on River City's Network**

27 10. I initially became aware of a possible cyberattack (hacking campaign)
28 against River City on or about January 15, 2017, when a database server was

1 compromised. By February 9, 2017, I realized that River City's network had been
2 heavily compromised and that the January 15 attack was not just an isolated hack.
3 Ultimately, this cyberattack proved designed to—and in fact did—cripple River
4 City's infrastructure and destroy its reputation.

5 11. The attacker, revealed to be Chris Vickery by tweets and multiple
6 news articles, methodically gained access to River City's network of computers and
7 databases. Vickery was never authorized by me or anyone at River City to conduct
8 his computer intrusions—River City did not hire him to conduct a security
9 penetration test.

10 12. In fact, Vickery downloaded gigabytes of River City's data that he
11 later shared with technology news bloggers and the public. Vickery publicly
12 tweeted about his activities:



19

20 13. Once Vickery gained access to River City's network, he did not merely
21 download and distribute River City's sensitive, confidential, and proprietary
22 data—he also intentionally caused severe damage to River City's network
23 infrastructure.

24 14. River City's employees and third-party technicians examined the
25 results of Vickery's attack and concluded that Vickery sent targeted commands to
26 River City's "netbox," a Linux-based server that provided a map (or "network
27 topology") of River City's network. Vickery's commands deleted nearly every
28 record in "netbox," effectively crippling River City's ability to manage its own


1 systems and conduct its normal business operations, let alone try to recover from
2 Vickery's malicious assault.

3 15. A true and correct copy of command line logs for River City's
4 computers is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and shows Vickery searching through
5 River City's network in a manner that only an intruder would use.

6 16. River City also discovered that Vickery used credentials (i.e.
7 usernames and passwords) stored in the data he downloaded to access multiple
8 third-party services used by River City in its business. Vickery logged into River
9 City's PayPal account and purchased domain names from one of River City's
10 domain registrars. Vickery accessed River City's company email accounts and
11 company Hipchat servers and chat histories. He accessed and misused River City's
12 Email Service Provider accounts (which is one method River City uses to send its
13 lawful commercial emails). Vickery also logged into or accessed River City's
14 affiliate network accounts and its GitHub account. These third-party services exist
15 on servers and computers not owned by River City.

16 17. Vickery even used River City's Email Service Providers to send
17 unlawful and offensive emails: appearing to come from one of River City's
18 principals (Alvin Slocombe), the emails had the subject line "Donald Trump's
19 Transvestite Surprise" and the body of the email contained the text, "Try and
20 Stop Me Bitch." River City did not authorize these emails to be sent.

21 18. I later discovered that Vickery hinted at his successful attack: on
22 January 18, 2017, Vickery tweeted that he had "found the goods":



27 **The Media Campaign**

28

19. Vickery's March 3, 2017, "teaser tweet" references "@SteveD3," or Steve Ragan, a technology writer employed by CSOOnline.com, with whom Vickery shared River City's data; in this tweet, Vickery thanks Ragan for "cooperating on investigation."

20. Vickery and Steve Ragan published their articles on March 6, 2017, without ever attempting to contact River City beforehand. The articles were a surprise and caused the vast majority of the reputational damage upon being published.

21. A true and correct copy of Vickery's March 6, 2017, Mackeeper.com article, located at <https://mackeeper.com/blog/post/339-spammerge-the-fall-of-an-empire> is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

22. A true and correct copy of Ragan's March 6, 2017, "Salted Hash" CSOonline.com article, located at <http://www.csoonline.com/article/3176433/security/spammers-expose-their-entire-operation-through-bad-backups.html> is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.


23. Vickery's March 6, 2017, tweet is a link to Ragan's story and Vickery's own blog at Mackeeper.com.



24. CSOonline.com calls itself the "leading source" for security professionals to "connect exclusively with key security decision-makers" and

boasts 786,000 average monthly page views from 395,000 average monthly unique visitors, according to the CSO Media Kit, posted online at <https://www.idgenterprise.com/reach/cso/>. A true and correct copy of the CSO Media Kit downloaded on April 28, 2017, is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.

25. Vickery then posted confidential information about River City's business operations to his Twitter feed:



26. Ragan included similar information from a file that contained company addresses in his follow-up story, posted on March 8, 2017, "SpammerGate: The takeaway lessons and follow-ups on the River City media data breach", available at <http://www.csoononline.com/article/3178395/security/spammergate-the-takeaway-lessons-and-follow-ups-on-the-river-city-media-data-breach.html>, last visited May 2, 2017, attached hereto as Exhibit 5:

3 Acme Media
 4 Ad Media Plus
 5 Bfons, LLC
 6 Blue Fences, LLC
 7 Books Of Wonders For Everyone Inc.
 8 Brand 4 Marketing, LLC
 9 Click This, LLC
 10 CloudFly
 11 Cloudspace Technologies
 12 Cooperative Investments, LLC
 13 DogWorkDot Inc.
 14 eBox
 15 FishChips
 16 ForceNet, LLC
 17 Grow Clientele, LLC
 18 Hatofish, LLC
 19 IR Media, LLC
 20 Its Technical, LLC
 21 Jasper Findings, LLC
 22 Javer Solutions
 23 JH Media, LLC
 24 Klaur Technology
 25 Luma Condominiums
 26 MH Marketing, LLC
 27 Media521, LLC
 28 Micromax Enterprises, LLC
 29 Pheasant Valley Marketing Group
 30 RCM Delivery
 31 RCM Idaho LLC
 32 River City Media, LLC
 33 Ryleker, LLC
 34 SAMM Inc.
 35 Site Traffic Network
 36 Slip7 Media, LLC
 37 Social Endavors, LLC
 38 The Wishing Well Company
 39 VR Endavors, LLC
 40 Virtual Ad Group, LLC
 41 Web Domains
 42 Wagon Dynamics, Inc.
 43 Zero Systems, LLC

Alternate business
 names used by River
 City Media

As a result of our story, one of the largest marketing firms working with RCM, Amobee, said the company was dropped from their affiliate service, AdDemand. However, this does nothing to prevent RCM and its staff from switching to a new alias and starting over. In fact, they're already attempting to switch aliases.

Late in the day on Monday, shortly after the story dropped, RCM employees started removing social media profiles and one switched her position from CEO of River City Media, to CEO of Slip7Media. The image to the left is a list of some of the aliases used by RCM, based on insurance documents and domain registrations.

Spamhaus added Domainers Choice (one of the registrars used by RCM) to the number two spot [on the Top 10 list of abused domain registrars](#), the index currently shows that 99.4% of the domains registered there are bad.

27. Lists of corporate entities, domain names, and IP addresses used by email marketing companies are carefully kept secrets and necessary components of running a successful business in this industry. River City considers such data its trade secrets. Ragan and Vickery caused enormous damage to River City just by disclosing these lists.

28. Ragan later tweeted about his participation in Vickery's "investigation" saying, "To be fair, @VickerySec and I have been working on this since Jan. We just didn't talk much about it much."

in reply to @gattaca



Steve Ragan @SteveD3 17h
 @gattaca To be fair, @VickerySec and I have been working on this since Jan. We just didn't talk about it much.



29. Ragan and Vickery obtained an enormous amount of data from River City, including information about River City's IP address infrastructure. In addition to IP addresses linking River City to Liberty Lake, Washington and Spokane,

Washington via River City's ISPs, TierPoint and Cutting Edge Communications, Inc., the data itself was rife with references to Washington.

30. The publication of River City's IP address infrastructure also allowed Spamhaus to immediately blacklist River City's entire infrastructure, which effectively prevented River City from conducting business.

31. Ragan and Vickery also referenced Spamhaus listings for River City and River City's associates—these listings all give clear indications that River City and its principals live in Washington:



The Effects of the Media Campaign

32. As a direct result of Ragan's and Vickery's articles, River City lost access to the internet because Spamhaus—in collaboration with Ragan and Vickery—blacklisted numerous IP address blocks used by TierPoint and Cutting Edge Communications, Inc., which could not continue operating while blacklisted by Spamhaus. TierPoint's and Cutting Edge Communications' only recourse with

1 Spamhaus was to kick River City off its network, which prompted Spamhaus to
2 delist TierPoint's and Cutting Edge Communications' IP address blocks, thereby
3 restoring useful internet access.

4 33. River City lost its office lease because its offices were located in
5 TierPoint's facility, which, without internet access, became useless to River City.

6 34. Spamhaus also blacklisted several domain registrars affiliated with
7 River City on suspicion of "illegal spamming" based on Ragan's article.

8 35. All of the above eroded River City's ability to function and resulted in
9 a near-cessation of business activity.

10 36. Because of the loss of income and business resulting from the
11 cyberattack and Ragan and Vickery articles, River City had to lay off fourteen (14)
12 employees and direct contractors and close down four (4) businesses, which in turn
13 caused three (3) additional businesses to be shut down as well.

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1 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
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3 Executed on May 5, 2017.
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7 Mark Ferris
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 5, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a notification of filing (NEF) to the following:

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Additionally, I caused true and correct copies of the foregoing to be served via first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, with a courtesy copy by email to:

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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

s/ Rachel Horvitz

Rachel Horvitz

Paralegal